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Abstract 
 
Consumer over-indebtedness is a topical and growing problem and Individual Voluntary 
Arrangements (IVA) are becoming the preferred solution for consumer debtors.  When 
successfully completed, an IVA provides permanent debt relief and an opportunity for an 
individual to have a new start, but when these arrangements fail the individuals find 
themselves in a worse financial situation often with no alternative other than bankruptcy.  
The Insolvency Service (IS) only publishes very limited data on the procedure and there has 
been limited research into the process. 
 
This project has provided the first data from a debtor‟s perspective.  The findings on the 
initial advice process provide evidence of the importance of face-to-face meetings and the 
need for the regulators to reinforce rather than weaken best practice guidelines to improve 
quality and consistency.  The breakdown in the relationship between Insolvency 
Practitioners (IPs) and creditors has caused a power struggle resulting in restrictive terms 
being forced on debtors, and finally the lack of an agreed approach for failed arrangements.  
The introduction of an agreed protocol in February 2008 will go some way to alleviating 
these problems.  Further research is needed into the causes of IVA failure and follow-on 
projects are suggested.  Due to the technical nature of this project a glossary of terms is set 
out on the next page. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
BERR Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Creditor An organisation or individual owed money by a debtor 
Consumer debtor A debtor without any trade debts 
Debtor An individual who owes money to one or more creditors 
DP Data protection 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
Failure (of an IVA) Each IVA proposal must specify the criteria for failure and in 
cases where there are contributions from the debtor one 
criterion may be when 3 or more payments are missed.  
IA86 Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended) 
Over-indebtedness Anyone who is struggling to keep up with payments and is 
suffering real financial hardship 
IO Interim Order – moratorium granted prior to agreement of IVA 
IP Insolvency Practitioner (IA86 introduced licensing) 
IPC The Insolvency Practices Council 
IR86 Insolvency Rules 1986 (as amended) 
IS Insolvency Service (executive agency of BERR) 
IVA Individual Voluntary Arrangement 
JIC Joint Insolvency Committee 
Nominee An IP appointed by the debtor to advise the court and creditors 
on the efficacy of the arrangement.  The role of the nominee is 
impartial and is distinct from the earlier role as adviser to the 
debtor. [r5.4 IR86] 
Protocol A set of documents agreed by creditors and IPs in respect of 
the content and format of debtors‟ proposals 
RPB Recognised Professional Bodies [section 391 IA86]  
(see Diagram 1) 
SIP Statement of Insolvency Practice - A series of best practice 
guidelines issued on various topics by R3 in conjunction with 
the RPBs, JIC and IPC 
SoS Secretary of State 
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
Supervisor An IP appointed by the creditors to administer the terms of an 
approved IVA 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
This paper looks at the causes of early failures in Individual Voluntary Arrangements 
or „IVAs‟.  The IVA is just one of the formal solutions available to individuals in 
financial difficulty and they are becoming the primary solution for consumer debt 
problems.  An IVA is a court sanctioned agreement between a debtor and their 
creditors and “fails” when the terms of the agreement are breached.  In order to 
understand the significance of IVA failure, the political and economic impact of over-
indebtedness on society will be discussed, followed by an explanation of the IVA 
process and the regulatory regime including market changes and behaviour.   
 
There has been industry concern over early IVA failures for some time (JIC, 2001 
cited 2004, IPC, 2005).  Despite this there is still no published data available so the 
problem cannot be measured or properly monitored (Green, 2002a, p. 23).  Green 
(2006, Ch.6, pp. 8-9) looked at four different ways to measure failures over time.  
Using the historical data, a conservative estimate shows approximately 25% have 
failed; around 30% of which occur in each of the first 2 years (see Table 1 and Figure 
3).  To match failures with completions the data has been time shifted based on the 
assumption that completed arrangements usually last 5 years, whereas failures 
usually occur within the first 2 years.  Using this rough measure between 1994 and 
1998 failures increased from 31% to 36% whereas between 1999 and 2003 they fell 
from 29% to 24%.  Despite this apparent improvement1 the absolute number of 
failures has more than doubled in the last 10 years and with it the number of people 
who have had to face failure twice2 with all the emotional and financial costs that 
involves. 
 
1.1  Consumer debt and over-indebtedness 
The consumer credit market has expanded rapidly in recent years and exacerbated 
the problem of over-indebtedness.  There is no agreed definition of over-
indebtedness but it has been described as “debt that has become a major burden for 
the borrower” (DTI, 2006, p. 24; Tribe and Cocks, 2008, p. 17).   
 
                                                     
1
 Pond‟s failure rate was 31% (Pond, 2002b, p. 53) 
2
 First by admitting insolvency, then by seeking a failed solution 
2 
 
TABLE 1 IVAs - Historical Data 
Year Completed Total 
% 
Year Failed Total 
% 
New 
% 
Total  
finalised 
Year New 
registrations 
Growth 
% 
          2007 42,231 -5 
    2007 7,320  16.6  2006 44,331 119 
    2006 4,034   19.9  2005 20,270 89 
    2005 2,376   22.1  2004 10,751 42 
2007 4,706 80.5 2004 1,142 19.5 15.1 1,142 2003 7,583 20 
2006 5,496 76.1 2003 1,726 23.9 27.4 7,222 2002 6,295 2 
2005 6,636 78.5 2002 1,821 21.5 29.5 8,457 2001 6,172 -20 
2004 5,839 76.4 2001 1,807 23.6 23.4 7,646 2000 7,729 7 
2003 4,415 72.5 2000 1,676 27.5 23.3 6,091 1999 7,195 47 
2002 3,263 70.7 1999 1,354 29.3 27.6 4,617 1998 4,902 8 
2001 2,722 63.9 1998 1,536 36.1 33.8 4,258 1997 4,549 2 
2000 2,539 63.3 1997 1,473 36.7 33.0 4,012 1996 4,466 2 
1999 2,632 62.5 1996 1,581 37.5 36.1 4,213 1995 4,384 -14 
1998 2,912 65.8 1995 1,514 34.2 29.7 4,426 1994 5,103 -10 
1997 2,599 68.4 1994 1,201 31.6 21.1 3,800 1993 5,679 21 
1996 2,349 72.8 1993 879 27.2 18.8 3,228 1992 4,686 56 
1995 2,221 81.6 1992 501 18.4 16.7 2,722 1991 3,002 56 
1994 1,741 87.2 1991 255 12.8 13.2 1,996 1990 1,927 57 
1993 1,264 92.9 1990 96 7.1 7.8 1,360 1989 1,224 57 
1992 804 95.7 1989 36 4.3 4.6 840 1988 779 93 
1991 468 97.5 1988 12 2.5 3.0 480 1987 404   
1990 335 99.7 1987 1 0.3   336    
1989 182          
1988 61           
1987 16           
Total 48,494 73.8%  17,469 26.6% 25.5% 65,704  68,496  
 
Source: IS (2008) and (2008a) 
 
Significant research has been focussed on measuring and defining over-
indebtedness (Barnwell et al, 2006; Bridges and Disney, 2004; Del Rio and Young, 
2005ab; FSA, 2004-6; Green, 2006; Kempson, 2002; Kempson et al, 2004; May et 
al, 2004; Oxera, 2004; Tudela, 2003; Tribe and Cocks, 2008) but despite this, all the 
measures have difficulty in differentiating between sustainable and unsustainable 
debt (Green, 2002). During 2007 
 
 the growth rate for consumer credit was between 5.2-6.0% (BoE, 2008) 
 outstanding balances totalled £224bn (some will have been repaid) at the end of 
the year (BoE, 2008) 
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 nearly 74% of credit card balances increased monthly with interest (BBA, 2008) 
 over 65m credit cards were in circulation with 31.4m cardholders (BBA, 2008) 
 10% of people missed a payment on their credit card, loan or mortgage (BBA, 
2008). 
 
Assuming just 5% of cardholders are over-indebted, then roughly 1.5m people, or 
three times the total aggregate of formal personal insolvencies over the whole of the 
last seven years3, may be in need of a debt solution.   Despite the increasing 
numbers, formal insolvencies are still low as a percentage of the working population 
(IS, 2006, p. 6) when compared to other countries.  The informal market has similarly 
expanded with 70-80,000 debt management plans estimated for 2005 (Green, 2006, 
Ch.4, p. 18).  These figures highlight the need to understand the relationship 
between personal insolvency and the wider consumer credit and banking market 
(Ramsay, 1997) both in the UK and globally (Tabb, 2005). 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
Source: Osterkamp (2006, p. 31) 
 
 
                                                     
3
 Between 2000 and 2007, bankruptcies and IVAs for England and Wales totalled 453,258. 
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1.2 The IVA process 
The Insolvency Act 1986 was the first major reform in insolvency legislation for 100 
years and it introduced the modern IVA4.  Initial take up was very slow with less than 
1,000 IVAs in the first two years, increasing to around 10,000 by 2004 and to 44,000 
by 2006.  The Enterprise Act 2002 was intended to encourage entrepreneurship and 
improvements to the consumer credit market.  An increase in consumer confidence 
was necessary to drive economic growth, which was achieved by encouraging the 
take up of consumer credit.  The 2003 White Paper listed the three key elements 
essential for an open and competitive consumer credit market as choice, information 
and protection.  The government‟s aim was to ensure that the consumer credit 
market functioned effectively, providing fair protection for the consumer debtor 
because the cost of over-indebtedness does not just fall on the individual borrower 
but affects financial institutions, other creditors, government and society as a whole 
(DTI, 2004, p. 4).   
 
This climate encouraged a few entrepreneurs in the insolvency profession to use the 
IVA procedure as a lucrative solution for individuals with consumer debt problems 
(Clarke, 2006).  Their business models relied on rapid expansion to fund their set-up 
costs.  It was in their interest to sell as many IVAs as possible, even where 
inappropriate for the individual debtor (Tribe and Cock, 2008).  To keep costs to a 
minimum the model generally used relied on low paid non-professionally trained staff 
to deal with small sections of the process, rather than a single manager or small 
professional team handling an individuals‟ case administration throughout the 
process.  The mass media advertising used to generate this business was 
inconsistent with professional standards5 (BBA, 2006).  The professional bodies took 
no action against these members and the consequent media frenzy resulted in a 
break down of the relationship between institutional creditors and IPs (ICAEW, 2007; 
BBA, 2007).  The institutional creditors were being accused of inappropriate lending 
(Kempson, 2002; Griffiths, 2005).  The creditors countered that IPs acting as 
nominees and motivated by self interest were prejudicing creditors by 
inappropriately6 advising debtors to enter IVAs that had little chance of success.  The 
whole image of the profession suffered as a result, with the only positive benefit 
                                                     
4
 Voluntary arrangements have a long legal history before the current format was introduced 
by Insolvency Act 1986(IA86)    
5
 Professional ethics require any advertising for services, achievements or products to be 
consistent with the dignity of the profession and project an image of a person bound by high 
ethical and technical standards (ICAEW members‟ handbook, Tribe, 2008). 
6
 The impartial nature of the role of the nominee is explained later. 
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being that information was disseminated more widely to the general public, although 
sometimes this information was misleading (Tribe and Cocks, 2008). 
1.3 Statutory and legal framework 
An IVA is a statutory contract or agreement between a debtor and his creditors.  An 
amount of less than 100p in £ is accepted by the creditors in full and final settlement.  
A „nominee‟, who must be a licensed IP7, presents a proposal to the creditors and, if 
approved at the creditors‟ meeting subsequently acts as „supervisor‟ of the 
arrangement.  The supervisor implements the terms of the IVA, reporting annually to 
the creditors and the court.  If the proposal includes regular payments, the payments 
must be made within the parameters agreed or the agreement is broken and the IVA 
fails.   
 
A unique feature of an IVA is that the IPs primary duty of care shifts as the each 
stage of the process is reached.  At the initial advice stage the IPs duty is to the 
debtor (SIP3, 2003, para 3.1) but once the proposal has been produced and the IP 
becomes the nominee, the IPs role changes and he is required to report impartially 
on the efficacy of the proposal to court and creditors (SIP3, 2003, para 3.4).  On 
appointment as supervisor, the IPs role is to implement the terms of the proposal 
dispassionately, while maintaining regular contact with the debtor.  In the event of 
failure the supervisor should comply with whatever conditions were set out in the 
proposal. 
 
To aid understanding of the complex and fragmented structure of the insolvency 
profession, a brief description of the regulatory framework follows, which is drawn 
from Finch (2002), Green (2006) and Walters (2008) and summarised in Figure 2.  
The Insolvency Service (IS) representing the Secretary of State (SoS) acts as the 
regulator of regulators with each of the recognised professional bodies (RPBs) taking 
responsibility for licensing and monitoring its own insolvency practitioners (IPs).  Two 
committees were set up on recommendation of the insolvency regulation working 
party to improve cooperation: the Joint Insolvency Committee (JIC) and the 
Insolvency Practices Council (IPC), which provide guidance on professional 
standards and ethics.  R3 (a trade association) publishes technical bulletins and best 
practice guidance (SIP3) in association with the RPBs, IS, JIC and IPC. 
                                                     
7
 Licensing was introduced by IA86 (Part XIII, ss388-398). 
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FIGURE 2 THE INSOLVENCY PROFESSION – REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
INSOLVENCY SERVICE 
Licensing 
RECOGNISED PROFESSIONAL BODIES 
Members: 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales;  
The Insolvency Practitioners Association;  
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants;  
The Law Society;  
The Law Society of Scotland;  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland;  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland 
 
JOINT INSOLVENCY COMMITTEE 
Members are representatives from each of the 
RPBs 
 
INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS 
License holders in January 2006 
were 1,688 (IS, 2006, p. 30) 
R3 
Association of Business 
Recovery Specialists 
Members: 
IPs plus other insolvency 
professionals with 
relevant qualifications 
and experience 
 
INSOLVENCY PRACTICES COUNCIL 
Members include: 
Chairman plus 
5 Lay members 
3 IPs representing the profession with 
rotating representation from the RPBs and 
R3 
Promotion of common 
professional and ethical 
standards 
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The original procedure was streamlined (Practice direction, Bankruptcy 1/91, [1992] 1 
All ER678) to shortcut the need for an interim order and by 1994/95 over 43% of 
cases used this procedure (Pond, 1998a, p. 4).  The Enterprise Act 2002 introduced 
further amendments, including a new fast track procedure specifically for 
undischarged bankrupts to convert to an IVA.  Although available since 1 April 2004, 
there has been a slow take-up of this option.  
 
1.4 Lack of data 
Despite all the media interest there has been very little research into the IVA process 
(Green, 2002a; Ziegel, 2003), the literature review in the next chapter will 
concentrate mainly on findings published by Green (2002) and Pond (1995-2002).  
The lack of data has been caused by the fragmented nature of the insolvency 
profession (see Figure 2).  Individual IPs have no interest in providing any data which 
has a personal financial cost to them without any perceived benefit.  The RPBs, who 
are fragmented, only see their role as enforcers of the legislation and have conflicting 
duties to the IPs as their members.  They do not form a coherent whole in their 
regulatory regimes (Finch, 2002; Green, 2006; Walters, 2008).  Despite collecting 
information on failures since 2003 no data has been published.  Lastly the IS, who is 
powerless to compel the provision of any data not specifically provided for in the 
legislation.   
 
Three areas arise as potential causes of early failures: initial advice process, 
inflexible terms and relationships between interested parties. This last issue includes 
the institutional behaviour of creditors who have effectively ganged up to obstruct 
debtor‟s access to an IVA even where the return is expected to be better than in 
bankruptcy.  An open forum called in May 2007 to discuss the breakdown of trust 
between IPs and the creditors resulted in an agreed protocol (IS 2008b) which came 
into effect on 1 February 2008.  If successful this should resolve some issues raised 
in this project and is discussed in more detail later.   
 
The empirical work on IVA failures by Green (2002) was the first available data.  
Updated extracts are shown in Table 1.  Pond‟s earlier research (1995-2002) was a 
longitudinal study and relied heavily on data obtained from the supervisors of IVAs.  
Both looked at legal developments and changes in the market structure including the 
changing relationships between IPs and creditors.  The next chapter evaluates their 
findings by reviewing the three areas identified above. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter focuses mainly on the work of two researchers, Pond and Green who 
have looked specifically at IVAs.  It identifies the gaps in available data on IVAs, the 
effect these issues might have on early failures and then compares the data 
produced.  The three areas which will be concentrated on are the initial advice 
process, inflexible arrangement terms and the relationships between the interested 
parties. 
 
2.1 Availability of data 
Prior to the report by Green (2002), there was no published data on the number of 
IVA failures.  Adverse publicity meant that IPs were being pilloried (Hughes, 2001) for 
taking nominees fees where prospective IVAs had no chance of success.  Green‟s 
initial analysis (2002, Table 4.4) provided limited data.  Further analysis showed 
failures were a fairly constant percentage of finalised cases between 1991 and 2002 
(35-40%) and subsequent data shows this percentage still falling (Green, 2006, Ch 6, 
pp. 6-7) rather than increasing.  However the changing market makes this measure 
unreliable and further research and analysis is needed. 
 
There are currently no criteria available to determine whether the failure rates are a 
product of market forces, bad advice or other issues which could be tackled to 
improve the success rate.  Pond‟s earlier research (1995) relied solely on data 
obtained from the supervisors of IVAs.  His data indicated that failure was linked to 
what he termed „debtor non-cooperation‟, a subjective supervisor measure.  However 
he identified some factors he could measure as being unrealistic terms.  These 
included duration, contribution levels and equity in the matrimonial home (1998b, 
1998a).  The initial advice process outcome fell outside these parameters.  This 
project examines data from debtor participants on this aspect but further work is 
needed to produce a reliable measure. 
 
2.2 Market structure 
The initial take-up of the IVA procedure in 1987 was slow (fewer than 100) but 
subsequently took off, levelling out between 5,000 and 6,000 annually between 1992 
and 2002 (Pond, 1995, p.1; 1998b, p. 2) before rocketing to the current registrations 
exceeding 44,000 in 2006.  The take up in the late 1980s was championed by a few 
specialist firms who recognised a niche market they could fill (Pond, 1995, p. 2). 
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These firms discreetly marketed the IVA as a solution to debt problems for 
professions prohibiting bankruptcy of their members e.g. lawyers, accountants, 
police, politicians, and armed forces personnel.  Many of these early IVAs involved a 
loan,1 providing a one off payment to creditors within a short period2.  These 
specialist firms were the forerunners of the large providers who market IVAs as a 
panacea to all debt problems (Ewing, 2007) and specialise in low cost consumer debt 
arrangements. 
 
TABLE 2    DISTRIBUTION OF IVA CASES AND PARTICIPATING FIRMS 1995-2006 
 
Year All 
 cases 
No. of 
firms 
No. of firms 
with >50% 
of  cases 
% of 
firms 
Biggest 
firm’s No. 
of cases 
No. of firms 
with ≥100 
cases 
% of cases 
handled by 
top 5 firms 
2006 44,331 339 8 2.4% 6,719** 47 48% 
2005 20,270 289 5 1.7% 3,290** 28 50% 
2004 10,734 288 5 1.7% 1,571** 18 46% 
2001 6,172 287 12 4.2% 889 12 36% 
2000 7,729 292 8 2.7% 803 21 34% 
1995 4,169 284 39* 14.0% 156 5 12% 
*53.4% of cases 
**Same firm 
 
Source: Green (2002a, p. 19) and  IS (2008) 
 
Table 2 updates Green‟s (2002a) original data on the market spread and 
demonstrates the polarisation of the market structure with a few large firms 
controlling the majority of registrations with several hundred smaller firms making up 
the remainder.  The largest firm registered more IVAs in 2006 than the total number 
registered in 1995.  The type of firm offering IVAs has also changed.  In 1995 the top 
20 firms included all the large accountancy firms (Pond, 1998b), but by 2000 this had 
changed to none (Green, 2006).  Table 2 shows the market is now dominated by 
firms who specialise solely in providing IVAs with less than 10 firms controlling the 
majority of new registrations.  It also includes other financial institutions 
predominantly debt management providers. 
 
Pond (1998b) identified the start of this trend towards processing centres.  He found 
that traditional accountancy firms sourced most of their work through creditor contact, 
generally in their local areas, whereas smaller firms used „work finders‟ who sourced 
                                                     
1
 Loan terms depended on the occupation and income of the individual. 
2
 Typically within 6 months of IVA approval. 
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their work from all over the country.  The outcome being that those who had more 
successful „work getters‟ ended up „stealing‟ work from outside their geographical 
location.  To counter these independent national „work finders‟ (or ambulance 
chasers) several large accountancy firms began offering their national clients a „free 
proxy service3‟ (Pond, 2002, p. 4) in return for supporting their nominations for 
appointment across all work types.   Green (2002b) expressed concern that the 
majority of IVAs were effectively controlled by these firms acting on behalf of creditor 
groups which stifles flexibility and fuels a culture of mistrust between supervisors and 
creditors, with debtors the casualty.  The independent work finders fought back by 
setting up organisations offering enhanced proxy and monitoring services for which 
they charge and the regulatory implications of these changes are returned to later. 
 
The increasing volume of IVAs is linked to the rising volume of consumer debt.  The 
percentage of them dealt with as IVAs increased from 12.2% to 18.6% between 1987 
and 1994 (Pond, 1998b, p. 6), whereas it had stayed fairly stable at around 9% for 
bankruptcy suggesting that IVAs were the preferred choice for consumer debtors 
during that period.  This change continued and Green (2002a, p. 15) suggested that 
by 2002 at least 90% of the IVA market were consumer debt cases, whereas Tribe‟s 
(2008, p. 137) sample indicated a slightly lower figure (88%)4.  There is a similar 
trend for bankruptcy with the 2006 data (IS, 2008, Table 2b) showing that non-trading 
individuals account for 82.7% of the total bankruptcies showing a steady increase up 
from 47% in 1998. Non trading debtors in this project totalled 86.4%. 
 
A key feature of this new popularity as a consumer debt solution was national 
advertising, which expanded the market and encouraged the rapid rise of „IVA 
factories‟ (Ewing, 2007, p. 5) with the inherent ethical issues they pose.  The current 
relaxation of ethical standards to accommodate payment for introductions under the 
guise of work done has caused a huge debate within the insolvency profession and is 
contrary to generally accepted insolvency principles (IA86, s164)5 on payment for 
introductions.  The change has fuelled the existence of marketing companies whose 
sole purpose is to collect leads for sale, with one IVA comparison website (Credit 
Today, 2008, p. 14) offering a pre-paid card with £50 to anyone signing up to an IVA.  
                                                     
3
 Completion, submission and meeting report 
4
 12% had trade debts 
5
 IA86 covers this issue for liquidators: “A person who gives, or agrees or offers to give, to any 
member or creditor of a company any valuable consideration with a view to securing his own 
appointment or nomination, or to securing or preventing the appointment or nomination of 
some person other than himself, as the company's liquidator is liable to a fine.” (s164 IA86) 
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These leads frequently change hands for substantially more than £50 depending on 
the data being offered with typically more than £500 being paid.  There is controversy 
over how these activities should be regulated with the majority of complaints being 
made by professional competitors (ICAEW, 2007).  In July 2007 the IS issued 
guidelines for monitoring volume IVA providers.  They recognised the different 
business models being used but did not include any guidance on payments for leads. 
 
2.3 Returns to creditors 
Returns to creditors are paid by way of dividends which are expressed in terms of p 
in £.  Dividends paid to creditors of an IVA are directly affected by its duration, costs 
and contributions 
 
When IVAs were originally introduced they typically lasted for periods up to 3 years 
this being comparable with the discharge period for bankrupts in 1986.  According to 
Pond (1998, p. 8), between 1988 and 1995 the average length of arrangements 
increased.  This can be contrasted to those lasting less than a year and in 1988 more 
than 50% of arrangements lasted less than a year. By 1994/5, this had decreased to 
just over 10%.  Arrangements lasting more than 4 years increased from around 11% 
to over 35% between 1988 and 1994 (Pond, 1998, p. 8) and to 45-50% by 2006 with 
around 10% lasting more than 6 years (Green, 2006, ch.6 pp. 5-8).  This increase in 
length was creditor driven (pp. 50-546), with the sole purpose being better returns by 
increasing the number of contributions from income.  Pond (1998b) suggested it 
indicated that debtors were willing to work harder to avoid bankruptcy and the 
associated stigma.  The downside of longer IVAs is the increase in administration 
costs.  More recently a hard line has been taken by creditors on the level of fees they 
approve (Seib, 2007) and arrangements being rejected where projected fees exceed 
limits set.  Having increased duration creditors have also sought to increase the level 
of contributions.   Pond (2002b) identified this as a debtor non-cooperation factor.  
 
IVA costs are generally cheaper than bankruptcy (Pond, 1995); with bankruptcy fees 
calculated on realisation and distribution scales accounting for 40% funds on small 
cases (Pond, 2002a, p. 7).  Pond‟s first sample showed IVA costs averaging 18.35% 
of realisations as opposed to 33% in bankruptcy.  Green (2002a) only looked at IVAs 
but found that costs were on average a third of realisations, indicating that costs had 
almost doubled.  Both Pond (1998a) and Green (2002) demonstrated that returns 
                                                     
6
 The role of the creditor and creditor power on IVA terms. 
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had also fallen during the same period.  This reflects the known market changes with 
an increasing number of IVAs with fewer assets with more reliance being placed on 
future income streams.  
 
2.4 Changing roles and relationships 
The roles and relationships between the interested parties in an IVA are complex.  
With the changes introduced by the large providers, supervisors are remote from 
individual debtors with administrative staff and advisers dealing with the day-to-day 
handling of cases (Tribe and Cocks, 2008).  The original intention of the IVA process 
was for the debtor, having realised he was in financial difficulty, to approach an IP 
with a proposal7 to be put to his creditors.  In reality very few debtors are able to get 
to this stage before they seek out an IP or other adviser and the proposal is usually 
prepared by the adviser based on accepted standards that have been developed 
since 19868.  At this stage in the proceedings (SIP3, 2003, s3) the IP‟s duty is to the 
debtor to ensure that the IVA is the best solution for their circumstances.  Once the 
content of the proposal has been agreed by the debtor and is ready for the report to 
court, the IP becomes the debtors‟ nominee9 and his responsibilities change.   
 
As nominee the IP owes a duty to the court to report on the efficacy of the proposed 
arrangement and to balance fairly the interests of the debtor and the creditors.  At 
this point the nominee should ensure that the debtor and any parties who may be 
injecting funds into the arrangement have been independently and appropriately 
advised by a third party (SIP3, 2003, para 3.2).  The IP no longer has a duty to the 
debtor and has to act impartially and be seen to be independent from all parties 
including the creditors (SIP3 2003, para 3.4).  The process to this point is clearly an 
ethical minefield and best practice10 requires this change to be clearly explained to 
each debtor.  This project has collected data from the debtors on how this process 
operated in practice. 
 
                                                     
7
 Rule 5.2 (IR86) 
8
 R3 issue standard terms & conditions plus Lawson (1999) & Bailey (2003) contain examples 
9
 IPs consent to act (r5.4 IR86) and report to court (r5.11 IR86 (IO) or r5.14 IR86 (no IO)) 
10
 “In many cases the member‟s role will change during the conduct of the case, for example 
from adviser to nominee to supervisor. These roles will involve different responsibilities: for 
example, when acting as adviser the member‟s role will be to consider the best course of 
action for the debtor in the light of their particular circumstances; when he becomes nominee 
his duty will be to the creditors and the court; and when acting as supervisor his 
responsibilities will be governed by the terms of the arrangement. The member should be 
mindful of possible conflicts of duty arising from these changes of role. He should ensure that 
his case records distinguish between these functions and that his remuneration in respect of 
each function is separately identified.” (SIP3, 2007, para 1.5) 
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The IP remains the nominee up to the approval of the arrangement, at which point a 
resolution is proposed for the appointment of a supervisor11.  During the meeting and 
in the previous period any amendments proposed to the arrangement by creditors 
must be agreed by the debtor (SIP3 2003, para 7.6).  There has been an ongoing 
publicly reported argument over modifications proposed by creditors who have 
grouped together to force through amendments that are not always a fair and 
equitable compromise.  The specifics of some of these clauses including their volume 
and competing nature are discussed in depth in the results and conclusions chapters.   
 
The role of creditors was mentioned earlier in connection with maximising their 
returns.  Pond (2002a) looked at the role of the creditor under the heading 
„therapeutic intervention‟ and his summary of the opportunities that creditors have to 
influence the outcome of an IVA is shown in Table 3.   
TABLE 3 OPPORTUNITIES FOR THERAPEUTIC INTERVENTION 
 
Before the 
s257
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meeting 
(i) Discussion with IP during 'design' phase of proposal 
(ii) IP knowledge of common proposal amendments put forward by specific 
creditors 
At the s257 
meeting 
(i) Tabling of amendments to proposal 
(ii) Conditional voting at the meeting 
After the s257 
meeting 
(i) Legal objection to outcome of meeting within 28 days (IA 1986, s 262) 
(ii) Variation of proposal following failure 
Source: Pond (2002a, p. 4) 
 
2.5 Success or failure 
Table 4 summarises the key issues for success (or failure) found by Pond (1998b). 
TABLE 4 KEY FACTORS IN SUCCESSFUL IVAs 
Feature 1987/88 1994/95 
Entry route No prior procedure (s.253) No prior procedure (s.253) 
Type Must contain some realisable assets 
with or without an income stream 
Must contain some realisable assets 
with or without an income stream 
Size Under £50,000 liabilities Over £20,000 assets with liabilities 
under £50,000 
Dividend 
anticipated 
Data not collected IVA dividend should be no more than 
20p better than the anticipated 
bankruptcy dividend 
Duration 24-36 months Any duration (but especially < 1 year) 
Source: Pond (1998b, p.16) 
                                                     
11
 The supervisor is usually the same person as the nominee (r5.25 IR86) 
12
 The s257 IA86 meeting is the creditors‟ meeting at which creditors vote for or against the 
proposal 
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Green (2002) had focused on the relationship between formal and informal activities 
of the financially distressed and he produced a series of indicators which he used to 
analyse the successfulness of the IVA process. He produced this graphically in a 
debt curve and demonstrated that success or failure was determined by their position 
on this graph (Green, 2002a, p. 57).  He looked at how well the IVA market operated 
and concluded that further research was needed on the causes of failure. 
 
2.6 Methodology 
The approaches of these two pieces of IVA research varied.  Pond‟s research was 
longitudinal in nature commencing in 1989 when he looked at 100 proposals 
commenced in 1987 and 198813, whereas Green‟s (2002) research is empirical in 
nature and relies heavily on the official data provided by the Insolvency Service.  
Green‟s report (2002) contained two pieces of original empirical research.  The first 
analysed historical data for IVAs completed successfully between August and 
October 2000.  The second, analysed arrangements started or proposed in autumn 
2001, and were based on data supplied by a panel of IPs who, in the year 2000, 
originated almost half the arrangements commenced in the UK, and by those 
creditors‟ representatives who dominated the approval process at the time.   
  
In contrast, Pond followed up his initial sample (879) from 1994/5 and revisited some 
of his original sample (490 – 30% response rate) in a longitudinal study (Pond, 
1998b, p. 5).  He obtained the majority of his data from questionnaires sent to the 
supervisors of the arrangements supplemented with explanatory interviews from a 
small sample.  There are a number of key differences in the approach of this project.  
Both Pond and Green used inductive strategies using their data to formulate theories.  
The strategy used in this project is deductive.  A number of research questions were 
posed with the actual results being discussed in conjunction with the expected results 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003).  Another difference is the source of the survey data for this 
project which was obtained not only from debtors but also from supervisors.   
 
                                                     
13
 IVAs registered in 1987 and 1988 were <1200. Registrations in 1987 were 404 and in 1988 
were 779 compared with 44,331 in 2006. 
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2.7 Rational choice theory  
Mises (cited in Smith, 1998, pp. 155-158), an economist, differentiated between the 
quantitative predictions of the natural sciences and the qualitative predictions of the 
social sciences by noting that humans by nature are individually unpredictable but 
that general patterns of behaviour are discernable.  Game theory is one example of 
this approach with the rational actors always behaving in a „minimaxing‟ way to 
establish patterns of behaviour in an endless number of scenarios from the simple 
game of chicken crossing a road to prisoners‟ dilemma in which two suspects being 
questioned separately face a number of choices on whether to confess or not 
depending on whether or not they think their partner will do the same.  This approach 
has been used by a several researchers to look at available strategies (Pond, 2002, 
Braham and Steffen, 2003).   
 
Pond used this approach to look at the choices faced by both debtors and creditors 
on entering into an IVA.  He used game theory to explain the reflexive nature of the 
process and the key role that „trust‟ plays in the relationship between creditors and 
IPs (acting for the debtor in the negotiations).  Moral hazard is key in this relationship 
as both the IP and the creditors have to assess the honesty of the debtor and his 
ability to fulfil the terms.  Pond calculated the chance of failure by looking at each of 
the risk factors (2002b, p. 54).  These included debtor non-cooperation, difference 
between the projected dividends (IVA v bankruptcy), the level of assets, creditor 
support and modifications.  In contrast, Braham (2003) used it to compare voting 
strategies in voluntary arrangements across different jurisdictions. 
 
The next chapter describes the methodology in more detail. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter starts with an overview of the methodology and theoretical grounding 
used, then looks at the detailed planning process including the population, sampling, 
data access and questionnaire design, including anticipated problems.  This is 
followed by a discussion of the ethical issues including personal and social issues of 
the participants, informed consent, identification, roles and relationships and data 
protection act requirements.  
 
The objective of this project was to look at the causes of early failures in IVAs 
Intuitively you would expect failures to increase as time progresses but in fact most 
failures (circa 60%) occur during the first two years (see Figure 3) which is why early 
failures are so important.   
 
FIGURE 3 
IVAs Finalised 2006
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Source: IS (2008) 
 
Chapter 1 explained the economic and political background to market changes, and 
why data on the causes of failure is lacking.  Chapter 2 provided a framework for the 
research questions being posed.  These research questions fall into three broad 
areas: the advice process, the terms of the arrangement, and the effect of the various 
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relationships on these and ultimately success or failure.  These are summarised in 
Table 5 and discussed further in Chapter 4.  Identification of possible improvements 
should lead to improvements in the IVA process. 
 
3.1 Rationale and theoretical grounding 
For this project empirical data was required as a framework and so a positivist 
approach was taken.  The research design was cross sectional (Bryman and Bell, 
2003) with the most recent available data being used (i.e. all failed, completed and 
new IVA registrations for 2006).    Survey methodology provided a systematic 
approach for collecting this data as „questionnaires provide consistent answers to 
consistent questions‟ (Sapsford, 1999, p. 5).  Their completion also provided a 
process for self-selection (Bryman, 2002) for the follow-up interviews, which was the 
only practical way of gaining access to this diverse and mobile debtor population.   
 
Quantitative approaches to research are often criticised for lack of depth of 
information, while qualitative research is criticised for being descriptive, trivial and 
ignoring the constraints of structure (i.e. only exists within a set of social relations 
which emphasises agency at the expense of structure) (Bryman and Bell, 2003).  
This project attempts a dual approach using the questionnaire responses to find 
debtors and supervisors willing to participate in follow-up interviews. 
 
The main arguments against using a multi-strategy is that each have embedded 
epistemologies and are in effect separate paradigms (Bryman, 2001).  However, 
using the logic of triangulation allows the qualitative data from the interviews to 
supplement and inform the quantitative data from the survey.  Data for this project 
was collected from different sources and both quantitative and qualitative methods of 
data collection and analysis were used.  Previous research relied heavily on data 
provided by supervisors, whereas the experience of the debtor is crucial when 
looking at the advice process and relationship issues.  In addition now that there are 
tens of thousands of IVAs14 rather than the few thousands when Pond15 and Green16 
started their research, the burden on supervisors would be much greater, and the 
response rate would suffer as a consequence.  Separately each approach would 
have provided useful data, but in isolation and without recognising the changing 
relationships within the IVA process. 
                                                     
14
 Registrations in 2006 were 44,331 and in 2005 were 20,270 (IS2008a) 
15
 Registrations in 1998 were 4,733 (IS 2008a) 
16
 Registrations in 2002 were 6,295 (IS 2008a) 
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3.2  Research questions 
The causes of early failures are the main focus of this project.  IVAs fail because the 
terms are breached, often caused by a shortfall in contributions.  This research 
concentrated on the reasons behind that failure and isolated those that could be 
influenced and potentially improved.  Two points emerged that were key to the 
process; the initial decision which relied on professional advice and the terms of the 
proposal agreed with the creditors.  Both could be influenced by relationship issues 
between the key parties.  The main propositions were therefore that bad advice, 
unfair terms or bad relationships separately or combined caused early failures.   
 
The findings on the initial advice process provide evidence of the importance of face-
to-face meetings and the need for the regulators to reinforce rather than weaken best 
practice guidelines to improve quality and consistency.  The breakdown in the 
relationship between Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) and creditors has caused a power 
struggle resulting in restrictive terms being forced on debtors, and finally the lack of 
an agreed approach for failed arrangements.  The recently agreed protocol (IS, 
2008b) should go some way to alleviating the issue of unfair terms. 
 
Table 5 presents these questions and relates them to the survey questions and 
coded data (SPSS variable names used are shown in the square brackets).     
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TABLE 5   RESEARCH QUESTIONS    
     
 
 
What  
issues  
influence  
the early  
failure  
of IVAs? 
Subsidiary questions Failed        
debtor 
questionnaire 
Completed 
debtor 
questionnaire 
Supervisor 
questionnaire 
Is failure higher for consumer debtors? Q 1 [trader] Q 1 [trader]  
Was the failure as a result of unforeseen external causes? Q 2 [xcauses]   
Did the quality of advice affect the outcome?    
Quality being defined as:         Correct in light of outcome 
Source / independence 
 Methods of communication 
 
Q 4(a) [acorrect] 
Q 4(b) [asource] 
Q 4(c) [amethod1 
 to 3] 
Q 4(a) [acorrect] 
Q 4(b) [asource] 
Q 4(c) [amethod1 
 to 3] 
 
Q 5 [linkorg] 
Q 3 [scomp /               
 scomt / scmm] 
Were the terms of the arrangement a fair compromise? Q 2 [xcauses] Q 2 [xcauses] Q 1 [termsa] 
For failed arrangements was bankruptcy the automatic 
outcome? 
Q 3 [bankrupt]  
Q 9 [fodebtctl] 
Q10 [outcome] 
Did the influence of any of the key relationships affect the 
outcome? 
   
Key relationships:       Advisor / Nominee influence 
Family influence 
Creditors terms 
Supervisor – communication 
Supervisor – pro-activity 
Supervisor – availability 
Q 4(d) [affluence] 
Q 4(e) [afamily] 
Q 5(a) [acreditor] 
Q 5(b) [scom] 
Q 5(c) [sproact] 
Q 5(d) [savail] 
Q 4(d) [affluence] 
Q 4(e) [afamily] 
Q 5(a) [acreditor] 
Q 5(b) [scom] 
 
Q 5(d) [savail] 
 
 
Q 5(a) [acreditor] 
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3.3  Target populations and sampling 
For the purposes of this project there are a number of target populations as data was 
sought from both debtors and supervisors.  These are dealt with separately below. 
 
3.3.1  Debtor sample 
Table 6 shows the populations and sample sizes for the surveys.  IVAs finalised 
during 2006 were divided into failures and completions, from which those less than 
12 months old were identified as the target populations for the  project. 
 
TABLE 6 IVAs FINALISED DURING 2006 
 
Registered 
during 2006 as: 
Total 
finalised  
<12 months 
old 
Sample  
Size 
No. of firms involved 
in early finalisation 
FAILURES 4034 (42.3%) 1413 (61.6%) 360 (60%) 128 (21.3%) 
COMPLETIONS 5496 (57.7%) 880 (38.4%) 240 (40%) 562 (93.7%) 
Total 9530 (100%) 2293 (100%) 600 (100%) 600 (100%) 
 
Source: Analysis of IS (2008) 
 
Discussions with the IS revealed the main issue they experience with debtor surveys 
is the number of responses that come back marked „gone away‟.  In some surveys 
undelivered questionnaires are as high as 60%, so in order to get a reasonable 
number of returns an initial sample of 600 debtor questionnaires24 was posted 
covering both failed and completed arrangements.  In an attempt to reduce the 
number of „gone away‟ responses the IVA failure list was checked against the current 
bankruptcy order listing to ensure the most up to date address available was used.   
 
TABLE 7 CROSS SECTION OF FIRMS - FAILURES REGISTERED 2006 
 
Firm code No. of firms Year 1 failures Sample per   
firm by size 
Total sample 
A 3 404 (28.6%) 32 96 (26.7%) 
B 6 365 (25.8%) 18 108 (30%) 
C 9 221 (15.6%) 6 54 (15%) 
D 1 14 187 (13.2%) 4 56 (15.6%) 
D 2 96 236 (16.6%) 1 46 (12.8%) 
Total  1413 (100%)  360 (100%) 
 
Source: Analysis of IS (2008) 
                                                     
24
 The IS already had 600 prepaid envelopes available 
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TABLE 8 CROSS SECTION OF FIRMS - COMPLETIONS REGISTERED 2006 
 
Firm code No. of firms Year 1  
completions 
Sample per   
firm by size 
Total sample 
A 9 82 (9.3%) 5 45 (18.8%) 
B 13 209 (23.8%) 4 52 (21.7%) 
C 35 197 (22.4%) 2 70 (29.2%) 
D 1 24 111 (12.6%) 1 24 (10%) 
D 2 482 279 (31.8%) 1 49 (20.4%) 
Total  878 (100%)  240 (100%) 
 
Source: Analysis of  IS (2008) 
 
3.3.2 Supervisor sample 
As regards supervisors, there are approximately 600 licensed IPs who currently have 
IVAs registered, of which only 146 had early failures registered.  Only three firms had 
in excess of 100 first year failures each during 2006, with a further 29 having 
between 10 and 100.  The sample of supervisors was stratified by firm size (coding 
explained on p. 28-29) and included a cross-section of the various size firms plus 
those with the largest and smallest failure and completion rates.   
 
The supervisor sample of 100 was selected to ensure that a maximum of one 
supervisor per firm was selected and that again each firm size was represented.  
This biased the sample towards the smaller firms but was compensated for by the 
fact that one supervisor from a larger firm covers a larger percentage of the debtor 
sample.   
 
TABLE 9 FIRM SIZE OF SUPERVISORS’ - FAILURES REGISTERED 2006 
 
Firm code Year 1 failures No. of supervisors No. of firms Total sample 
A 404 11 3 3 
B 365 6 6 6 
C 221 9 9 9 
D 423 120 120 82 
Total 1413 146 138 100 
 
Source: Analysis of IS (2008) 
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3.3.3 Sampling method 
A random sample would normally provide the most statistically reliable outcome but 
the very low response rate of most surveys mean that the responses are unlikely to 
be representative.  As firm size was potentially a useful variable the decision was 
made to use a stratified sampling technique to improve the chances of obtaining a 
cross section of responses.  In this case the sample was systematically selected by 
firm size after analysing the total population.  The sampling method combined with 
the low response has meant that results are not statistically valid but some tentative 
conclusions have been made from the combination of available data.  
 
Each sample was stratified by firm size based on the overall failures and completions 
for the year.  In addition, 275 failed debtors were identified using the same selection 
method.  The stratification was completed by giving each firm a size code.  Initially 
these were split into groups of 10 which were subsequently recoded into four groups 
A-D.  Firm code A being firms with more than 100 failures, Firm code B with failures 
between 50 and 99, Firm code C with failures between 20 and 49 and Firm code D 
with failures of 19 or less. A similar stratification was used for selecting early 
completions. 
 
3.4  Questionnaire design  
Three variations were required for the questionnaires.  The emphasis of the debtors‟ 
questionnaires was on their experience of the whole process, while the supervisor‟s 
questionnaire concentrated on what they perceived to be their processes and 
avoided asking questions that would require specific data from their files.  All 
participants were invited to provide examples or additional comment and were invited 
to use whatever method of communication they felt most comfortable with (either on 
the questionnaire, by telephone or email).   
 
The questionnaire used a variety of techniques including simple yes/no answers, 
multiple choice and rating scales.  They were piloted with a sample of colleagues to 
obtain general feedback on structure, wording and layout.  The debtor questionnaires 
were circulated by post during October and December 2007 and the supervisor 
questionnaires were circulated by email during the same period.  
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3.5  Data collection  
Responses to self-completion questionnaires can be low. Tribe (2006) achieved a 
rate of 11.5%, but the response rate to the present project‟s debtor survey was only 
just over 6%, with firms classified as completions reaching the target of 10% and 
lower responses from firms classified as failures (just under 5%).  In his survey of 
supervisors, Pond achieved responses from 69% in 1995 and 30% in 1998, 
compared to only 22% in the present project, the majority of which only being 
received after several reminders and chasing telephone calls. 
 
The main practical issue affecting the outcome of this project was the unexpected 
postal strike.  There were complex consequences.  The most obvious was the initial 
delay which caused further delays in the replies being returned.  This was 
compounded by printing errors which came to light from an initial batch of returned 
mail.  Due to the negotiations on access the questionnaires were sent out via the IS 
post room and consequently control over the final output was lost.  The initial 
circulation was repeated and in some cases three copies of the same documents 
were sent.  This in itself raised a further problem with some participants phoning to 
complain they were being victimised because they had received first one and 
sometimes the second or two further copies in the same post because of the post 
strike.  Others returned completed duplicates which were later picked up during the 
coding process and removed.  These printing errors also affected some batches of 
the questionnaires which made completion more complicated. 
 
For supervisors there were different issues.  The questionnaires were provided 
attached to an email, the format of which was controlled by the IS.  Several 
participants struggled to complete the questionnaire electronically and during follow-
up calls were happy to complete them over the phone.  Previous research has shown 
that response rates and accuracy are improved by offering completion via the 
telephone (Hira and Kostelecky, 1995).  During the final round of reminders the 
questionnaire was included in the actual body of the email which made return and 
completion a one click action.  This did elicit some additional responses. 
 
Some alternative data was sourced from the IS, which consisted of responses from a 
survey of 2,000 mixed IVA users (including failed, completed, and ongoing cases) not 
yet analysed by the IS.  The focus of this research was on simplification of the 
process, but there was one question on the primary cause of their IVA failure and two 
on previous debt relief and how they heard about the IVA process.  There was also a 
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question that asked them to rate their ease/difficulty of understanding the various 
stages of the process. 
 
Full follow-up telephone interviews were conducted during January and February 
2008 participants.  Every debtor and supervisor who offered to take part was 
approached, but some were not contactable or had changed their minds. In addition, 
some provided limited feedback via a shorter telephone conversation, email or on 
their questionnaires.   
 
The use of telephone interviews was based on convenience and cost.  The relevant 
questionnaire was used as a topic list.  Any anomalies noted on the questionnaire 
were marked for discussion during the interview and all interviewees were invited to 
elaborate on their answers and provide any other information they felt relevant. The 
interview notes and additional comments made on the questionnaires were typed up 
and collated.   
 
3.6 Data access, protection & analysis  
The IS is the gatekeeper of the IVA register.  A part-time secondment was negotiated 
to allow full access to the register.  A secure mailbox and mailing facilities were also 
provided.  The quantitative survey data was coded according to the themes of the 
research questions (see Table 5) and SPSS was used to generate frequency 
distributions.  The qualitative data from the interview transcripts and other meeting 
notes were also coded thematically.  Quotations were selected to illustrate the 
findings under each heading. 
 
3.7 Ethical considerations 
The guidelines being used during this project are the British Sociological Association 
Statement of Ethical Practice (1993).  Ethical issues fall under a number of headings 
and include personal and social issues of the participants, informed consent, 
identification, roles and relationships, data protection and the use of professional 
ethical guidelines.   
 
3.7.1 Personal and social issues of participants 
Financial health can be compared to physical health in many ways as the data is 
equally as sensitive to the individual, but is often treated as less so by financial 
institutions that share and sell the information.  Participants were advised of the 
procedures in place to anonymise and secure the data from this project.  The IVA 
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and Bankruptcy register is open for inspection by the general public plus a lot of 
detailed personal data is copied to creditors with the proposal including details of 
income and day to day expenditure.  The availability of data from the IVA register and 
the impact of this are discussed later together with other data protection 
requirements. 
 
3.7.2 Ethical dilemmas and informed consent 
Obtaining informed consent from the participants was treated with care to ensure the 
participants did not feel coerced into taking part.  A guidance letter was issued using 
a „frequently asked questions‟ format. Those involved in the follow-up interviews were 
self-selecting. 
 
3.8 Project Review 
The aim of this section is to reflect upon the practical experiences and their 
implications on the theoretical and methodological issues discussed earlier.  The 
practical problems encountered with the data collection have been discussed above.  
This section will look first at data protection issues and then at the reflexive nature 
and problem of bias in this project.   
 
3.8.1 Data collection and analysis 
Data protection was an issue raised by participants as the questionnaires all arrived 
at the same time as various stories hit the headlines about loss of government data 
(BBC, 2007, Hastings and Copping, 2007).  Calls were received requesting more 
information on how the personal details had been obtained and others on its security.  
A surprising number of the participants seemed to be completely unaware of the 
requirement for IVAs to be registered (IS, 2004).  Some IVA providers do not appear 
to be aware and have therefore not informed their debtors that the register has been 
publicly available since 2004 (Tribe and Cocks, 2008, pp. 77-82). 
 
The low response rate has meant that the analysis performed on the data has been 
limited with the non-response bias being an important factor in interpreting the 
results.  Although data from different sources have been used to bolster the findings 
the dissimilar datasets mean that they are not directly comparable. 
 
3.8.2 Bias 
The difficulties encountered with the sampling and data collection processes during 
this project raised various issues but in particular it highlighted the problem of dealing 
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with bias.  Bias has conflicting definitions and the range depends on the 
epistemological view being taken.  Quantitative researchers use it to discuss 
significance levels whereas qualitative researchers use it to encompass all forms of 
error including procedural, systematic, haphazard, culpable, non-culpable and every 
combination (Hammersley, 1997, para 4.7).  Qualitative research is criticised for bias 
by using concepts such as „truth‟ and „objectivity‟ and more specifically because the 
„researcher is the instrument of research‟ (Hammersley, 1997, paras 1.8, 2.1). 
 
Problems have occurred at every level in this project.  The inaccessibility of the 
population and the self-selecting element of the respondents meant any 
interpretation of the data is limited.   One example is the age group of the debtor 
participants who did respond.  The younger element (18-27) of the sample selected 
(SPSS data: 15.8%) was not well represented in the responses (SPSS data: 6.7%) 
and quite a few parents phoned or wrote explaining their children had moved away.  
This sub-section of the sample is more mobile and not well represented in the 
results.  Of those who did respond in the younger age group they were exclusively 
female whereas the sample was almost 50:50 split.  Gender and age combinations 
may be important when looking at motivational issues and need further investigation. 
 
Other debtor participant problems included identifying the researcher as working for 
the IS despite the letter explaining the need for the secondment to allow access to 
the data.  This may well have put off some from responding.  Despite the high non-
response rate only 11.8% of the failed debtor questionnaires and 19.6% of completed 
debtor questionnaires (see Table 10) were returned marked „gone away‟.  These 
were both low in comparison to the expected rates.  Calls received confirmed that a 
lot of the completed arrangements relied on property sales of the addresses used 
which explains the higher return rate for completions (see Table 11).   There was 
also some adverse reaction from the supervisors who equally failed to either read or 
understand the explanatory letter.  One supervisor identified the researcher as a 
potential competitor and refused to respond on the basis that they thought the results 
would not be fairly presented and the data would be manipulated.  Like the debtors 
others thought an incentive should have been offered with one quoting the amount of 
fees he had lost while talking. 
 
The nature of the population and the process of self selection in this project biased 
the respondents and the data obtained.  Most of those who volunteered for the 
follow-up interviews admitted to being „motivated‟ to take part because they felt there 
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had been some injustice in their case.  One method of compensating for this problem 
was the triangulation of the data from multiple sources and using different methods 
(Hammersley, 1995, p. 214).  Even though the main focus of this project was failed 
arrangements the issues being investigated were universal across all IVAs and the 
inclusion of a similar sample of completed arrangements was intended to provide a 
benchmark for comparison.  Each of the samples was stratified by firm size in an 
attempt to obtain some data across all firm sizes from each source.  This was not a 
success and the supervisor sample had no responses in one category.   
 
The questionnaire design similarly suffered from problems.  During the design phase 
they were piloted, but despite this errors were still made in the wording and format.  
The questions were reworded but some still asked leading questions which became 
more obvious during the coding process.  Equally responses from the communication 
question required interpretation and would have benefited from being split.   
 
The creditor as one of the key players in the IVA process did not have a voice in this 
project.  Consideration was given to including interviews with financial institutions but 
time constraints prevented this (Tribe and Cocks, 2008, p. 59).  Pond (2002c) 
interviewed two major banks and compared their different approaches to dealing with 
individuals in financial distress. For the purposes of this project their perspective was 
based on statements made by their representatives in the press and at the forum.   
 
Finally the researcher always has the final say on what is or is not included in the 
results (Bourgois, cited in Taylor, 2002, p. 17) and therefore “the role of the 
researcher in generating the data collected must be recognised” and “rather than 
seeking to eliminate reactivity, its effects should be monitored and, as far as possible 
brought under control” (Hammersley, 1995, p. 123).  Hence the question of bias can 
only be addressed by researchers being critical about their own design, methodology 
and interpretation of data.  Researchers by being aware of all the potential sources of 
bias can more readily report and situate the knowledge gained from the data 
collected. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
Chapter 1 provided the background to this project and how over-indebtedness has 
resulted in the increasing popularity of IVAs as a solution of choice.  The lack of 
research and available data on failures has also been discussed.  Chapters 2 and 3 
provided the framework for the project.  This chapter provides an overview of the 
data collection process followed by the detailed findings as they relate to each 
element of the research question.  The implications of these findings on public policy 
are discussed in more depth in chapter 5.   
 
4.1 Overview 
Turning to the areas identified for investigation, these were the advice process, the 
terms of the arrangement and the influence of the relationships between the 
interested parties.  The subsidiary research questions included looking at whether 
the quality of advice or specific terms in the arrangement affected the outcome, and 
how the relationships influenced the terms. 
 
The data collected consists of questionnaires from debtors (both failed and 
completed), questionnaires from supervisors and follow-up interviews from a cross 
section of the participants including debtors with failed and completed IVAs and 
supervisors.  Other participants provided additional feedback in shorter telephone 
conversations and by email.  The debtor survey responses are summarised below.   
 
TABLE 10  DEBTOR QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
 Posted  Responses With trade 
debts 
With 
consumer 
debts only 
Returned 
‘Gone away’ 
FAILURES 635 (100%) 31 (4.9%) 8 (1.3%) 23 (3.6%) 75 (11.8%) 
FAILURE  
status in doubt 
 1 (0.1%)  1 (0.1%)  
COMPLETIONS 240 (100%) 24 (10%) 5 (2.1%) 19 (7.9%) 47 (19.6%) 
Total 875 (100%) 56 (6.4%) 13 (1.5%) 43 (4.9%) 122 (13.9%) 
 
One hundred supervisor questionnaires were sent out of which 19 were returned 
already completed and a further 3 were completed over the telephone during follow-
up calls.   
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Some additional data was provided by the IS from a recent survey to supplement the 
survey data from this project and this is summarised in Table 11.   
 
TABLE 11 INSOLVENCY SERVICE DEBTOR QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
 Sample 
posted  
Returned - 
Failed 
Returned – 
Ongoing 
Returned - 
Completed 
Total 
responses 
YEAR 05-06 1000 5 31 3 39 (3.9%) 
YEAR 06-07 1000 9 187 36 232 (23.2%) 
Total 2000 14 218 39 271 (13.6%) 
 
The three issues identified as being linked to failures were: the quality of advice; the 
terms of the arrangements; and the influence of the interested parties.  The 
relationships issue impacts on both the advice process and the terms of the 
arrangements.  The detailed findings are presented by looking at the advice process, 
the terms of the arrangements and the influence the key players have.  Relationships 
issues are also intertwined with these processes. 
 
4.2 The advice process 
The quality of the advice process was investigated by looking at „correctness‟, 
independence and the impact of the method of communication.  The influence of 
professional advisers and friends and family are also included under this heading.  
This was done by asking a series of interlocking questions about the advice process.  
The roles of the IP and his staff were discussed earlier (section 2.4). 
 
The first question to be analysed looked at „correctness‟.  It was expected that those 
whose arrangements had failed would feel they had been given incorrect advice, 
unless there were other external causes, and vice versa for completed 
arrangements.  Table 12 confirms this proposition.   
 
TABLE 12 DEBTOR QUESTIONNAIRES – ADVICE 
 
In light of your experience do you think you received the correct advice to enter into 
an IVA?  
 Trade  
debts  
Responses Yes No 
FAILURES Yes 8 (100%) 0 (0%) 11 
(34.4%) 
8 (100%) 21 
(65.6%) FAILURES No 24 (100%) 11 (45.8%) 13 (54.2%) 
COMPLETIONS Yes 5 (100%) 4 (80%) 19 
(79.2%) 
1 (20%) 5 
(20.8%) COMPLETIONS No 19 (100%) 15 (78.9%) 4 (21.1%) 
Total  56 (100%) 30 (53.6%) 26 (46.4%) 
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Included in those who felt they had been given the wrong advice were five 
successfully completed arrangements.  Follow-up information was obtained from one 
of these participants.  His IVA offered a remortgage and a single payment to his 
creditors.  The remortgage was arranged with an associated firm without any 
apparent regard to his ability to continue to repay it in the long term.  He had not 
understood the terms he was agreeing to and in his case the lack of a face-to-face 
meeting was a key issue which is discussed further later.   
 
The method of communication was looked at next.  It was anticipated that more 
failures would result from telephone advice than from face-to-face meetings because 
of the higher likelihood of misunderstandings.  Indeed, the results show that only 
65% of failures had been seen in person compared to 75% for successfully 
completed IVAs. 
 
TABLE 13 DEBTOR QUESTIONNAIRES – COMMUNICATION 
 
  Responses In person By telephone By letter / email 
FAILED 32 (100%) 21 (65.6%) 25 (78.1%) 18 (56.3%) 
COMPLETED 24 (100%) 18 (75.0%) 22 (91.7%) 17 (70.8%) 
Total 56 39 (69.6%) 47 (83.9%) 35 (62.5%) 
 
The follow-up interviews in this project provided evidence of misunderstandings 
leading to participants feeling they had been given the wrong advice. 
 
“It was all done through the post … No I didn‟t read all the small print and 
everything and the next thing you know they said I can‟t have life insurance 
for the mortgage because you are too old.”    
(Debtor - successfully completed arrangement) 
 
“Nobody ever came to the house or sat and talked to me.  It was all done by 
post”. 
(Debtor - failed arrangement) 
 
Analysing the same data by firm size and cross referencing this the „correctness‟ was 
revealing as some might argue that this problem was exclusively with the larger firms 
but from the responses shown in Table 14, there is no evidence of this.   A more 
robust analysis of this data was not possible due to the low response rate. 
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TABLE 14 DEBTOR QUESTIONNAIRES – COMMUNICATION 
 
Firm size Correct 
advice 
Responses In person By telephone By letter / email 
A Yes 
13 (23.2%) 
4 (10.3%) 6 (12.8%) 4 (11.4%) 
A No 5 (12.8%) 7 (14.9%) 4 (11.4%) 
B Yes 
18 (32.1%) 
7 (17.9%) 8 (17%) 9 (25.7%) 
B No 6 (15.4%) 5 (10.6%) 4 (11.4%) 
C Yes 
9 (16.1%) 
3 (7.7%) 7 (14.9%) 4 (11.4%) 
C No 0 2 (4.3%) 2 (5.7%) 
D Yes 
16 (28.6%) 
7 (17.9%) 6 (12.8%) 6 (17.1%) 
D No 7 (17.9%) 6 (12.8%) 2 (5.7%) 
Total  56 (100%) 
39 (100%) 47 (100%) 35 (100%) 
39 (69.6%) 47 (83.9%) 35 (62.5%) 
 
The supervisors‟ survey asked a similar question in respect of the method and 
frequency of their contacts.  Over 95% of the supervisors said they conducted 
interviews in person with a third of those responses categorising debtor take-up as 
rare rather than frequent.   
 
TABLE 15 SUPERVISOR QUESTIONNAIRES – COMMUNICATION 
How does your firm usually provide advice? 
Firm 
size 
Responses In person By telephone By letter / email 
Frequently Rarely Frequently Rarely Frequently Rarely 
A 3 (100%) 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%) 3 (100%) 0 2 (66.7%) 0 
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 0 1 (100%) 0 1 (100%) 0 
D 18 (100%) 13 (72.2%) 4 (22.2%) 12 (66.7%) 4 (33.3%) 9 (50%) 7 (38.9%) 
Total 22 (100%) 
15 (68.2%) 6 (27.3%) 16 (72.7%) 4 (18.2%) 12   (54.5%) 7 (31.8%) 
21 (95.5%) 20 (90.9%) 19 (86.4%) 
 
Those supervisors who took part in the follow-up interviews stated that they always 
offered to see people personally, but people in employment often had difficulty in 
taking time off work to see an advisor.  Others found debtors were embarrassed 
about their situation and found it more comfortable to discuss their problems over the 
telephone. 
 
“We have a team of people who can visit if they want a face to face meeting.  
A lot of people are very embarrassed talking about debt and if it‟s not 
convenient because of where they work or whatever so we offer the 
telephone as well.” 
(Supervisor - firm size C) 
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Surprisingly the majority of debtors had nothing but praise for their advisors 
regardless of whether or not they thought they had been wrongly advised.     
 
“They were very good and I can‟t fault them.” 
(Debtor - failed arrangement) 
 
“I always got straight through to her and she was very good actually…” 
(Debtor – successfully completed arrangement) 
 
Having determined whether the debtor participants thought they had received the 
correct advice and the impact of the method of communication, the final component 
was to discover how persuasive they felt that advice had been on their decision to 
enter into an IVA25.  It was expected that the majority of participants would be 
strongly influenced by the professional advice they had received.  This was borne out 
by the data, with over 80% considering the advice influential (72% felt the advice had 
to be followed).   
 
TABLE 16 DEBTOR QUESTIONNAIRES – INFLUENCE OF ADVICE 
 
How influential was the professional advice you received in your decision to opt for 
an IVA? 
 Trade 
debts  
Responses Not 
influential 
Persuasive Felt advice 
had to be 
followed 
Not 
answered / 
Multiple 
answers 
FAILURES  Yes 3 (100%) 0 0 2 (66.7%) 1 (33.3%) 
FAILURES  No 12 (100%) 1 (8.3%) 2 (16.7%) 7 (58.3%) 2 (16.7%) 
FAILURES All 15 (100%) 1 (6.7%) 1 (6.7%) 9 (60%) 3 (20%) 
COMPLETIONS Yes 3 (100%) 0 0 3 (100%) 0 
COMPLETIONS No 18 (100%) 1 (5.6%) 1 (5.6%) 14 (77.8%) 2 (11.1%) 
COMPLETIONS All 21 (100%) 1 (4.8%) 1 (4.8%) 17 (81%) 2 (9.5%) 
Total  36 (100%) 2 (5.6%) 3 (8.3%) 26 (72.2%) 5 (13.9%) 
 
This highlights the need for all professional advisers to spend the time needed at the 
outset, and explain to the debtor „the pros and cons‟ of all the options available.  In 
organisations where the IP is not directly involved in the initial advice process there 
needs to be good training and strict quality control to ensure that non-professional 
staff are giving the best advice to each individual, and not effectively selling a product 
to meet targets. This was reinforced by some of the comments from the follow-up 
interviews. 
                                                     
25
 Those participants who had been advised that another option was better for them were 
asked not to answer this question. 
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“My debt burden caught up with me big time at the end of 05 - a time of great 
personal stress on a number of fronts, including family illness followed by the 
deaths in early 2006 of both my mother and stepfather.  I found the [name 
removed] website and sent them an email and was subsequently contacted 
by an advisor, who was very nice and helpful but was in the business of 
selling me an IVA.”  
(Debtor - successfully completed arrangement) 
 
“IVAs are being pushed by companies simply because they make a lot of 
money by doing so.” 
(Debtor – failed arrangement) 
 
“I felt my supervisor bullied me into entering the IVA even though I didn‟t think 
I could afford the repayments.  As soon as it was passed I found it difficult to 
contact him.” 
(Debtor – failed arrangement) 
 
4.3 The effect of relationships 
The issue of the relationships between the key players are an integral part of the 
whole process and affect both the quality of the advice and the terms of the 
arrangement.  Although looked at separately the results reinforce the overall findings.    
 
The first relationship explored was between the debtor and the supervisor or his staff 
and whether the latter‟s availability for support and advice aided successful 
completion.  The expected response was general agreement for the successfully 
completed arrangements but some disagreement for the failed arrangements.  This 
was proved correct and despite a number of adverse comments the majority of the 
debtor participants had nothing but praise for the people who they had contact with.  
The majority (66.1%) reported they had good relationships and good access to the 
supervisor‟s staff (see Table 17).   
 
“I was supported throughout until the IVA was complete. Thereafter 
availability for further advice was offered without time limit.” 
(Debtor - successfully completed arrangement) 
 
However it appears that even though the relationship between IPs and the debtors 
are important it does not automatically affect the final outcome.  Problems of access 
were reported in about a quarter of the successfully completed arrangements and a 
third of the failed arrangements (Table 18).   
 
“He took weeks to reply to my letters, continually lost documents, set 
payments far too high, would never recommend this company to anyone…  
felt treated as a fourth class citizen.” 
(Debtor - successfully completed arrangement) 
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TABLE 17 DEBTOR QUESTIONNAIRES – SUPERVISOR AVAILABILITY 
 
 “My supervisor or other member of staff was always available for me to speak to or 
would return my call / email promptly.” 
 Completed 
questionnaires 
Agree Disagree Don’t know 
or prefer not 
to answer 
FAILURES  33 (100%) 19 (57.6%) 11 (33.3%) 3 (9.1%) 
COMPLETIONS 23 (100%) 18 (78.3%) 5 (21.7%) 0 
Total 56 (100%) 37 (66.1%) 16 (28.6%) 3 (5.3%) 
 
A further question on proactivity was addressed specifically to the debtor participants 
of failed arrangements with a view to finding out whether the relationship changed 
when an arrangement looked like it was failing.  It might be expected that during 
imminent failure the supervisor or his staff would be in more regular contact with the 
debtor.  However, more than half the participants disagreed, including nearly all of 
those with trade debts.  This suggests that when arrangements are failing 
supervisors appear to be disinterested in addressing the problem and leave the 
debtors to initiate contact.   
 
“Once it was clear that the IVA was going to fail they were really horrible to 
us.  We should have gone bankrupt straight away.” 
(Debtor - failed arrangement) 
 
“I found [name removed] to be un-informative and unhelpful. Their [sic] only 
concern was to keep the first year's payments as their commission.” 
(Debtor - failed arrangement) 
 
There was anecdotal evidence that family and friends were often involved in the 
advice process and the next question was testing the assumption that the same 
people would have a strong influence over any advice received.  It was expected that 
this would be especially so in cases where more than one member of the household 
was in financial difficulty.  This was not borne out by the responses received with only 
just over a quarter confirming that family and friends influenced their final decision.  
However, of those who confirmed that family and friends were involved, the 
percentage of completed arrangements was almost double the figure for failed 
arrangements.  This could indicate that where family have influenced the decision, 
support is also provided which help debtors to complete successfully.   
 
From the follow-up interviews discussing financial problems was considered 
sensitive, and even with friends, the subject is often avoided until the problems are 
forced into the open.   
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“I found it quite daunting and humiliating having to ask people for financial 
help.  Although after I‟d done it and mentioned it to a work colleague, she 
said: “I‟m in the same boat as you” and so many people have come to me and 
said the same.  You don‟t realise how many people are keeping things like 
that quiet and now I feel much better that I know so many other people who 
are in the same situation.”   
(Debtor - failed arrangement) 
 
The last but probably the most important role to be looked at is that of the creditor.  
The creditor relationship is multi-faceted and both their relationship with the debtor 
during the pre IVA period and their ongoing relationship with the IP can be vital to the 
acceptance of the proposed terms.  The key issue is the acceptance by a creditor 
that once an IP takes on the role of nominee his report on the efficacy of the 
arrangement is prepared with due diligence and not with the intent to „rip them off‟ for 
the benefit of the debtor. 
 
To assess how both the debtors and supervisors felt about these relationships they 
were given a series of statements relating to creditor influence to agree or disagree 
with.  The responses expected were that both debtors and supervisors would feel 
that creditor groups had gone too far in dictating unreasonable terms as a backlash 
to the irresponsible advertising of IVAs and accusations of irresponsible lending.  
This was confirmed by the debtors with 58% (excluding non-responses and „don‟t 
knows‟) and by 95% of the supervisors. 
 
TABLE 18 SUPERVISOR QUESTIONNAIRES – CREDITOR INFLUENCE 
 
How do you think the interests of creditors are reflected in the IVA process for 
consumer debt cases? 
Firm size Responses Very 
representative 
Slightly biased 
 in their favour 
Very biased 
 in their favour 
A 2 (100%) 0 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 
B 0 0 0 0 
C 1 (100%) 0 0 1 
D 17 (100%) 1 (5.9%) 1 (5.9%) 12 (70.6%) 
Total 20 (100%) 1 (5%) 5 (25%) 14 (70%) 
 
The follow-up interviews with the debtors explored the reasons for the „don‟t know‟ 
responses (45%).  Participants commented they felt overwhelmed by the process 
and often failed to ask the right questions.   
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“I felt dreadful at the time, very shameful over the situation that I was in so I 
didn‟t ask all the questions that I should have done.  I wish I had asked more 
questions now.” 
(Debtor - failed arrangement) 
 
This emphasises the need to ensure that advice and information is provided in 
different ways and at different times to ensure the debtor has the opportunity to 
absorb all the information and make an informed decision.  This is discussed in more 
detail later. 
 
4.4 The terms of the arrangement 
The supervisors in their survey were asked for examples of unreasonable terms 
being imposed by creditors and the debtors were asked a similar question during the 
follow-up interviews.  The three problem areas commented on were the imposition of 
hurdle rates, the incompatibility of multiple modifications, drafting errors and the 
outcome for failed arrangements. 
 
Minimum expected dividend rates have been used by creditors for many years and 
these have become known as hurdle rates.  However, in the last few years this 
practice has proliferated.  Pond (1998b) concluded that arrangements where the 
difference between the expected dividend in an IVA versus bankruptcy was more 
than 20p were more likely to fail.  The increased use of hurdle rates has meant that 
the increase in the expected return in IVAs is usually substantially more than in 
bankruptcy and this return is obtained by increasing the contributions to an 
unsustainable level.  
 
“[Name removed] is insisting on onerous conditions which he (the debtor) 
can‟t meet.  In bankruptcy the creditors would get about 10p in £ - they are 
insisting on 65p in £.  The fallback position for him (the debtor) will be to sell 
the business to a limited company and then go bankrupt.  The business 
employs 6 people.  Every case needs to be looked at on its own merits and 
trying to up the dividend beyond reasonable terms is counterproductive and is 
costing the creditors money.” 
(Supervisor - firm size D) 
 
 
“He was telling us what we could afford rather than us telling him what we 
could afford.” 
(Debtor - failed arrangement) 
 
“Modifications received consistently uplift the debtor‟s voluntary 
contributions…  We strive to set the voluntary contributions at a level that is 
(a) high enough that it gives creditors a return significantly higher than the 
alternative of bankruptcy, and (b) low enough that the debtor is confident they 
[sic] can afford the payments for 60 months.” 
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(Supervisor - firm size D) 
 
Most arrangements fail because the debtors can no longer afford the contributions.  
This can be caused by either the contributions being set too high at the outset or 
because of a change in circumstances.  Only three of the participating debtors had 
arrangements failed for other reasons.26  This is reinforced by the IS data, which 
included nine failed arrangements, of which five stated they had failed because their 
payments had been set too high.  Of these, two had a drop in their income which was 
not accommodated for in the proposal.   
 
The incompatibility and volume of modifications being proposed by different creditors 
often causes rejection or failure.  The key complaint from supervisors was that 
creditors or their agents are not reading the proposals and just insisting on 
modifications regardless of the circumstances of each case.  In much the same way 
as hurdle rates are being used as a minimum requirement other terms are being 
proposed as modifications in every case regardless of whether they are already 
included.  The result is that competing groups of creditors have devised contradictory 
terms which would make nonsense of any proposal and in most cases it is evident 
that the creditors are not even reading the proposal on offer. 
 
“We have had 79 modifications put forward for a straightforward consumer 
IVA.” 
(Supervisor - firm size D) 
 
The new IVA protocol (IS, 2008b) should address this problem.   
 
A slightly different issue, but as equally damaging, are drafting errors in the 
arrangement.  Any material errors invariably cause failure and although it is the 
debtor‟s responsibility to ensure that the documentation is correct the convoluted and 
legalistic nature of the standard proposals means that the majority rely on their 
advisers and invariably sign the documentation without checking the detail.   
 
“We told our advisor that my husband was due to be made redundant and this 
wasn't included in the proposal.” 
(Debtor - failed arrangement) 
 
 
“The IVA was not arranged properly.  There were a few serious 
miscalculations.  The whole thing took months and months to arrange.  
                                                     
26
 These included the failure to disclose a credit card, a house that was sold for less than the 
valuation and the third on the insistence of the IR for breaching their requirements. 
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Admittedly we did not notice that the figures did not add up; we were just 
pleased it was all done.” 
(Debtor - failed arrangement) 
 
This reinforces that what was originally intended as a simple and flexible procedure 
has become over legalistic (Green, 2002) and too complicated for the majority of 
debtors to follow and understand without substantial guidance.   
 
4.5 After failure 
Once an IVA has failed the debtor is essentially back in the same position or even 
worse off financially having paid money into an arrangement with little or no benefit to 
the creditors.  Best practice requires every proposal to include clear terms on what 
action is to be taken in the event of failure.  Historically the intention was for 
bankruptcy to be this final solution but creditor pressure has resulted in this clause 
being removed from most arrangements leaving debtors in failed arrangements to 
either find the deposit and present their own bankruptcy petition or deal with creditors 
piecemeal offering payments as and when they have funds.   
 
“They did say they were going to go to the creditors and see if they were 
going make me bankrupt but I never heard anything about that so I just take it 
that they didn‟t want to make me bankrupt.” 
(Debtor - failed arrangement) 
 
Different creditor groups are looking for different outcomes and the issue of 
competing terms being proposed was referred to above.  Very few creditors of failed 
consumer debt IVAs file bankruptcy petitions.  The reason appears to be a desire to 
retain the opportunity (however slight) of collecting something in years to come rather 
than having to write the whole debt off if the debtor is made bankrupt.  The 
consequence is that creditors whose debt collection processes are more robust will 
then gain a commercial advantage bypassing the rigours of pari passu.  It is therefore 
not surprising that over 80% of the supervisors confirmed that they had removed the 
mandatory bankruptcy clause from their standard proposals and were unlikely to 
make a failed debtor bankrupt unless specifically requested to by creditors.   
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TABLE 19 SUPERVISOR QUESTIONNAIRES – OUTCOME – BANKRUPTCY 
 
Does your standard set of proposals include mandatory bankruptcy on failure? 
Firm size Responses Yes No 
A 3 (100%) 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.6%) 
B 0 0 0 
C 1 (100%) 0 1 (100%) 
D 18 (100%) 2 (11.1%) 16 (88.9%) 
Total 22 (100%) 3 (13.6%) 19 (86.4%) 
 
All the participants who had been made bankrupt had filed their own petitions with 
the majority being encouraged to do so by their supervisors. 
 
The key findings include the lack of face-to-face meetings for the initial advice 
process and the effect this has on the ability of debtors to understand the process 
and what they are agreeing to.  This is compounded by the high degree of influence 
that professional advice has on the recipient.  Another key issue raised is the 
problem of onerous conditions being enforced by creditors.  The recent introduction 
of an agreed protocol should go some way to redressing this imbalance.  Finally the 
lack of a real outcome for debtors whose arrangements have failed is a cause for 
concern and the creditor motivation behind this change is discussed in more depth in 
the conclusions.   
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
This project was borne out of the debate over the increasing numbers of IVAs and 
the consequential increase in early failures.  The purpose of this project was to gain 
insight into those causes.  The results can now be put into context using the 
framework of issues raised by Green and Pond summarised in chapter 2 and the 
current debate on the way forward.   
 
The conclusions are split into two groups: conclusions relating to the advice process 
including communication, influence and contact issues, and conclusions relating to 
the terms of the arrangements including relationship issues with creditor groups.  The 
chapter concludes by listing some suggestions for new projects. 
 
5.1 The advice process 
The key issue emerging from this aspect of the project was the effect of a lack of an 
initial face-to-face meeting.  The combination of IPs delegating the role of adviser to 
more junior staff (sometimes in call centres) combined with the lack of face-to-face 
contact are the problem.  This move away from meetings in person has been driven 
by the changes in the market structure despite best practice guidance27 to the 
contrary.   This guidance was modified28 by the RPBs in April 2007; however, all the 
participants in this study should have been interviewed in person by the IP or staff 
except where there were exceptional circumstances.  This did not happen with less 
than 70% having face-to-face interviews.   
 
It is clear from the data that this requirement was routinely ignored by advisers and 
was not enforced by the RPBs.  The response to this compliance failure was to relax 
the guidance in 2007 rather than enforce what had been considered best practice for 
many years (SIP3, 2007).  The result is that debtors do not have the opportunity to 
discuss all their options in the best circumstances.  Those who are elderly and less 
able to understand the implications of what they are agreeing to are disadvantaged.  
Even the amended guidance issued in 2007 requires an interview to be offered, 
                                                     
27
 SIP 3 v 3 became mandatory 1 October 2003 and required a face-to-face initial meeting 
28
 SIP 3 was modified with initial meetings no longer being mandatory with effect from 1 April 
2007 
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especially when the adviser is of the opinion that a meeting in person would be 
appropriate.29   
 
“I do think people my age should be taken into consideration and they should 
send somebody out to see you rather than doing it all on the phone or through 
the post.” 
(Debtor - successfully completed arrangement) 
 
This finding replicates findings concerning credit agreements (Kempson, 2002, p. 59) 
where individuals who were not provided face-to-face contact during the formation of 
the contract were unaware of their cancellation rights.  In Kempson‟s case, those with 
financial difficulties were particularly disadvantaged30.   
 
5.2 Creditor power 
There is general agreement that IVA terms are currently overly dictated by creditor 
groups.  The data collected for this project confirms this conclusion.  This power 
struggle between creditors and debtors is not a new phenomenon and the issue was 
addressed by Cork (1982, p. 13):31 
 
„In the complex world of credit, the legislature and, through the legislature, 
society has always striven hard to maintain a just balance between the 
creditor on the one hand and the debtor on the other.  Over the centuries this 
balance has shifted first one way and then the other.  In considering where it 
should be today, it must be remembered that it is the creditor who possesses 
the capital - which, in the aggregate, is the capital of society as a whole - to 
which the debtor seeks access for purposes beneficial first to himself, 
secondly to the creditor in providing him with a market for his capital and, 
thirdly, to society as a whole.‟  
 
An IVA should represent a fair compromise between the debtor and their creditors.  
There is evidence to suggest that some modifications enforced by creditors actively 
contribute to the failure of arrangements. Green (2002b) looked at the behaviour of 
                                                     
29
 „On initial contact with the debtor, the member should offer to meet personally, or arrange 
for a suitably experienced member of his staff to meet the debtor. If the debtor declines the 
offer, the member or a suitably experienced member of his staff may conduct the initial 
interview on the telephone. However, if during the telephone interview, the interviewer forms 
the opinion that either the debtor does not fully understand the matters described in 
paragraphs 3.2 to 3.5 or that the debtor has not adequately disclosed his financial 
circumstances, the member should insist that a meeting in person be conducted.‟  (SIP3 
2007, para 3.1) 
30
 3% of households were affected but of those 50% were in financial difficulty 
31
 The Cork Report was the basis for the Insolvency Act 1986  
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the creditors and expressed concern that the process was controlled by key creditors 
through a handful of agents.  This polarisation has continued to breaking point.  In 
May 2007, a meeting between all the stakeholders started a discussion process 
culminating in the implementation of a protocol effective from 1 February 2008.  This 
protocol (IS, 2008b) embodies a number of documents whose terms include the 
limitation of modifications and the use of an agreed common financial statement 
(calculation of contributions from income and allowable expenditures).  The conflict 
has in part been addressed by the protocol but only time will tell if it will be effective 
in restoring trust.  A standing committee will be monitoring any reported abuse but 
already some creditors have stated they reserve the right to continue to propose 
modifications in the key areas of contribution levels and minimum dividends (hurdle 
rate).      
 
5.2.1 Contribution levels 
Most of the debtor participants interviewed thought that their contributions had been 
set too high including some of those who had managed to complete successfully.  
For those that had failed it was either the main cause or contributed to the failure of 
their arrangement.  These comments were evenly spread across all firm size groups.  
Pond‟s research (1998b) highlighted the correlation between big differences in 
expected dividends and success.  Those arrangements where the difference 
between the expected dividends in IVA32 and bankruptcy was less than 20p had 
more chance of success.  Supervisors appear to be setting contributions at 
unmanageably high levels because the hurdle rates of some creditors would 
otherwise put IVA‟s beyond the reach of many low paid individuals.  These are 
artificially imposed rates which do not follow the criteria set down in the legislation.  
Part of the new Protocol (IS, 2008b) includes agreement to use the common financial 
statement for income and expenditure which should help both creditors and 
supervisors33 in ensuring contributions are pitched at sustainable levels.   
 
                                                     
32
 The Nominee is required to include in his report a comparison of the expected between an 
IVA and Bankruptcy (SIP3, 2003 p.6.4 (h)).  This is the difference being referred to by Pond 
(2002b, p.54). 
33
 “Before recommending an IVA to a debtor, the member should be reasonably satisfied, on 
the basis of an assessment of the debtor‟s income from all declared sources and his stated 
expenditure needs, that the debtor has sufficient income to sustain the payments proposed 
under the IVA” (SIP3 para 3.7). 
CCCS guidelines on income and expenditure are those being used in the protocol. 
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5.2.2 After failure 
The majority of supervisors confirmed that they no longer make the debtors in failed 
IVAs bankrupt.  Creditor pressure groups have been insisting that bankruptcy on 
failure is not mandatory as they prefer to have the option to continue debt collection 
by other methods.  As a result most debtors of failed arrangements are left to deal 
with their creditors piecemeal.  Most in this study resorted to filing their own 
bankruptcy petitions once they had saved or borrowed the deposit required.  From a 
public policy perspective more data is required.  The question of why creditors want 
to continue leaving these debts outstanding must be addressed.  Returning to the 
data provided in the introduction there is clearly a large and growing number of over-
indebted individuals.  Credit card write-off rates have increased from 2% in 2000 to 
7.5% during 2007 (BERR, 2007).  The decision to remove mandatory bankruptcy for 
failed IVAs may be a way of artificially keeping the increase in write-offs down to 
acceptable levels in lenders published figures or alternatively allowing them 
subsequent opportunities to pursue the debt. 
 
5.2.3 Variations 
Some failed debtor participants were unaware that an IVA could be varied within the 
first year.  Several were told by their supervisors (or their staff) that it was too early to 
propose a variation, the inference being that this was a statutory prohibition rather 
than a term inserted by the creditors.  This approach does not recognise the need for 
flexibility in today‟s changing employment market, and resulted in the failure of some 
arrangements.  More than 70% of the failed arrangements failed because the 
debtors‟ circumstances changed and their arrangements were not flexible enough to 
cope.  This restriction on variations has been imposed by some creditor groups and 
providers as a standard term and cost saving measure.   
 
5.3 Future research 
Further work is required on the causes of IVA failures and a better measurement 
needs to be constructed for failure rates as part of an ongoing project to look at the 
advice process in more depth.  This could also include the provision of more data on 
failures from supervisors and the circulation of questionnaires to all failed debtors as 
an ongoing project.  This could be part of a longitudinal study looking at what 
happens to debtors post failure providing insight into the outcome for debtors with 
failed IVAs.  The follow-up interviews provided an interesting starting point for this 
project.  The theme could be debt forgiveness and the role that creditors are playing 
in not wanting debtors to get a new start.  This project could also include debtors‟ 
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attitudes towards the stigma of bankruptcy (Athreya, 2004) and why some are 
involved in serial IVAs rather than petitioning for their own bankruptcy.  The 
questions to be looked at could include: What motivates an individual to avoid 
bankruptcy at any cost? Best practice guidance issued to IPs could be improved to 
include provision for dealing with debtors post failure. 
 
A second aspect stressed by several participants was financial awareness.  This is a 
researched area (Reifner, 2003) which needs a new approach.  Kingston University 
ran a pilot project with a series of Financial Awareness Workshops which were cut 
short due to lack of interest.  There was positive feedback from the attendees but 
incentivising people to attend is the problem with some countries making attendance 
part of the rehabilitation process (Berry, 1999).  A number of psychological issues 
were noted both around debtors admitting they have debt problems and the 
motivations for taking part or not taking part in surveys.  Financial health needs to be 
treated in the same way as physical health as there are similar taboos.  This could 
form one strand of an education programme; greater understanding of people‟s 
motivation could help in promoting and targeting new workshops.  Linked to this are 
age and gender issues and more data and analysis is needed to see if targeted 
programmes would be more successful. 
 
Green (2006) has produced some data on the male/female split including data on 
joint arrangements.  Green suggested that data on households (as an economic unit) 
would be more useful for identifying trends and issues than individual IVAs (Green, 
2002a, Ch. II, p. 16).  It would also be useful to know if having another member of the 
household in debt has a knock on effect to other members and whether this affects 
credit, or future job prospects.  There has been some research into the effect on job 
prospects (Ambrose, 2004).   
 
The relationship between consumer spending and the housing market has been 
investigated (Benito et al., 2006). The relationship with IVAs and the number of 
equity release schemes could be a starting point for investigating this relationship 
further including the connections between financial institutions and IVA firms.   
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